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Active labor market policies (ALMPs) are an important instrument for governments in dealing with 
the new challenges of globalization, flexibilization, and individualization of labor markets. Politics 
and research has focused on the supply-side of the labor market, that is, regulating the rights 
and obligations of the target groups of ALMPs (mainly unemployed and inactive persons).  The 
role and behavior of employers is under-researched and under-theorized in the vast literature on 
ALMPs and industrial relations. In this article, we analyze ALMPs from the employers’ perspective 
by examining the determinants of firms’ participation in providing wage subsidy jobs for the 
unemployed. First, we examine the historical background to the introduction and development of 
wage subsidy schemes as an important ALMP instrument in Denmark. Second, we derive theoretical 
arguments and hypotheses about employers’ participation in ALMPs from selected theories.  Third, 
we use data from a survey of Danish firms conducted in 2013 to characterize the firms that are 
engaged in implementing wage subsidy jobs and hypotheses are tested using a binary logistical 
regression to establish why firms voluntarily engage in reintegrating unemployed back into the labor 
market.  We find that the firms which are most likely to participate in the wage subsidy scheme are 
characterized by many unskilled workers, a higher coverage of collective agreements, a deteriorating 
economic situation, a Danish ownership structure, and are especially found in the public sector.  This 
shows that the preference formation of firms is more complex than scholars often assume.
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Meeting the challenges of the globalization of trade and the increasing importance of knowledge in production, firms have adapted their production practices and utilization of labor in the production function (Barr, 2001, p. 169). This has 
led scholars to point to a decline in the price of low-skilled labor as a result of both 
the high- and medium-skill bias of the technological process and the massive increase 
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in the supply of low-skilled labor following the emergence of global labor markets 
(Berthold, 1997; Acemoglu, 2002; Standing, 2009). These developments have signifi-
cantly increased the unemployment risks of low-skilled labor (Bonoli, 2010). Faced 
with economic circumstances characterized by “permanent austerity” due to a shift 
from manufacturing to services (Iversen & Wren, 1998; Pierson, 2001), nations have 
moved away from “decommodifying” social transfers and found novel ways of meeting 
social risks of long-term unemployment. A solution to this came in the form of ALMPs 
(Crouch et al., 1999).
European countries have, according to their national institutions and political coali-
tions, adopted ALMPs in different ways (Iversen, 2005, ch. 6; Bonoli, 2010). However, 
one element is salient; that there is a need to involve employers and employer organi-
zations in the policy process in order to make ALMP effective and responsive to the 
demands of the labor market (Martin, 2000; Martin & Swank, 2012). Despite their 
importance, we nevertheless lack evidence on why and how employers participate in the 
delivery of ALMPs. This is probably due to the fact that ALMPs tend to focus on the 
“supply-side” of the labor market and aim at improving the motivation and qualifica-
tions of jobseekers and the unemployed. The demand-side is taken-for-granted and not 
explicitly addressed in policy design or implementation (cf. Ingold & Stuart, 2015; Aa & 
Berkel, 2014).The article is structured as follows: The first section presents the historical 
background of the policy program analyzed in this article, the Danish wage subsidy jobs 
scheme (løntilskud). Focus will be on the political decisions and reforms that made this 
scheme one of the main instrument in Danish ALMP. In the second section, a number of 
different theories of employers’ participation in social and welfare policies (e.g., ALMPs) 
are described and empirical hypotheses are derived. The third section describes the data 
and methods. The fourth section presents the empirical findings and the last section dis-
cusses the results and presents the conclusion.
Employers and Danish aLMPs
Denmark has been a frontrunner in the development of ALMP and the engagement of 
employers in the governance of labor market policies (Auer, 2000; Schmid & Gazier, 
2002). However, in the last decade, the “macro-corporatist” tradition of involving 
employers’ associations and trade unions in the implementation of ALMPs has been 
somewhat weakened. This was mainly due to the introduction of a new governance 
structure of local job centers in municipalities from 2007. Local job centers became 
responsible for the implementation of ALMPs with delegated authority from the cen-
tral government. In this process, the role of the social partners in the formulation and 
administration of employment services was marginalized (Bredgaard, 2011). However, 
policy-makers and local job centers are struggling to engage employers in the recruit-
ment of unemployed jobseekers and to participate in the delivery of ALMP programs 
at the workplace level. This mixed trend makes it interesting to study empirically how 
employers actually engage in ALMPs.
Previous comparative studies indicate that Danish employers participate actively 
in ALMP compared with British and German employers (cf. Martin, 2004; Martin & 
Swank, 2012; Nelson, 2013). In the early 2000s, Martin (2004b, p. 130) found that 
68% of Danish employers participated in ALMPs compared with 40% in the UK. 
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Comparing Denmark and Germany, Nelson (2013, p. 40) found that although roughly 
the same percentage of firms participated in ALMPs, the participation of Danish firms 
was much more intense than in German firms. In a more recent survey of employer 
engagement in Denmark and the UK, Ingold and Valizade (2015) found almost similar 
levels of employer participation in general, but that participation in “funded programs” 
(like wage subsidy, young person apprenticeships, or one-off and on-going payments) 
was much higher in Denmark (50%) than in the UK (16%).
In the current study, we use the participation of employers in the wage subsidy 
scheme as an indicator of participation in ALMPs. The wage subsidy scheme was intro-
duced for long-term unemployed in 1978 (arbejdstilbudsordningen). The wage subsidy 
scheme was the first example of an ALMP-instrument in Denmark. The official objec-
tive was to improve employment opportunities of participants, but due to the severe 
unemployment crisis in the late 1970s and 1980s, the scheme in reality became oriented 
toward avoiding the expiration of unemployment benefit insurance for long-term unem-
ployed. When unemployment benefits expired, the long-term unemployed were offered a 
“suitable job” for up to 9 months, which gave them a right to another 2½ years of unem-
ployment insurance. In practice, this meant that the unemployment benefit period could 
be extended indefinitely and no one would fall out of the unemployment benefit system. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the wage subsidy scheme was reformed to improve 
the employment opportunities of participants. First, rights to formal education and train-
ing programs for up to 1½ years were introduced in 1987 (cf. Rosdahl, 2003). Second, 
the right to a new period on unemployment insurance benefits after participation in a 
wage subsidy program was abolished in 1993. This meant that the objective of partici-
pation changed from regaining rights to unemployment insurance benefits to improving 
the employment opportunities and qualifications of participants. At the same time, the 
duration of the unemployment benefit period was reduced in from 7 years to 5 years in 
1995, then 4 years in 1998, and finally 2 years in 2010. Additionally, a new scheme (indi-
vidual job training) was adopted for “disadvantaged” unemployed on social assistance 
who had difficulties in finding ordinary employment. In 2000, a supplementary scheme 
was introduced where unemployed could participate in short-term training in local firms 
(arbejdspraktik, later named virksomhedspraktik). Participants in this type of company 
internship (virksomhedspraktik) do not receive wages or follow collective agreements, 
but stay on their former income benefits (unemployment insurance or social assistance). 
Currently, the duration of the wage subsidy is up to 6 months. In the public sector, 
the wage level is equal to the benefit level. In the private sector, the wage level is equal to 
the wage level of the prevailing collective agreement (the employer tops up from approx-
imately net benefit level to agreed wage). The wage subsidy scheme is mainly used for 
unemployed persons with a certain level of skills and qualifications, for instance persons 
on unemployment insurance benefits, who are considered closer to the ordinary labor 
market than persons on social assistance. The participation of employers in the wage 
subsidy scheme is, therefore, an indicator of the engagement of employers with ALMPs. 
We consider it to be a good indicator, since it is one of the most used and effective instru-
ments in Danish ALMPs and requires a deeper level of involvement of employers than 
other instruments. 
In Fig. 1, we illustrate how participants in ALMPs in Denmark are distributed on 
the three main ALMP instruments: (1) Guidance and education, (2) wage subsidies (løn-
tilskud), and (3) company internships (virksomhedspraktik). 
50 Employers and the Implementation Thomas Bredgaard and Jon Lystlund Halkjær
There are two observations to make. First, the global financial crisis from late 2008 led to a 
sharp increase in all the three ALMP instruments. Second, participation in ALMP declined 
after 2011 especially in “guidance and education,” while participation in enterprise appren-
ticeships and wage subsidies remained constant or only slightly declined. “Guidance and 
education” is an administrative category including a diverse range of different programs, 
such as municipal counseling and training courses for the “least employable,” job search 
assistance provided by private providers as well as shorter training courses and formal 
education programs. After a number of negative media reports, the politicians in 2011 
decided to get rid of so-called “meaningless activation programs” (especially job search 
assistance with private providers and municipal counseling and training programs). The 
central mechanisms for refunding the expenditures of ALMPs in local municipalities were 
changed so that wage subsidies and company internships received a higher refunding from 
the central government than “guidance and education” programs.
To sum up, successful ALMPs require engaged employers who are willing to recruit 
unemployed persons or participate in the delivery of ALMP programs. This basic argu-
ment is increasingly acknowledged by Danish policy-makers. Turning to the employers, 
we now consider what motivates them to participate in the delivery of ALMPs. 
Theories of employer engagement in aLMP
In the literature, there are a number of relevant theoretical starting points for a dis-
cussion of employers’ participation in the implementation of ALMPs. From a general 
review of the literature, we have derived six possible explanations for employers’ par-
ticipation in ALMP (cf. Tab. 1). 
Figure 1: Participation in active labor market policies, 2007–2014 (full-time participants).
Source: Jobindsats.dk; own calculations.
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The theories can be categorized in a number of different ways. Some are macro- 
theories from which we can deduce hypothesis about how the institutional framework 
and political economy make it more or less likely that firms participate in social and 
welfare policies (e.g., varieties of capitalism, power resource theory, and institutional 
theory). Others are micro-theories that may explain why individual employers choose 
to participate or refrain from participating in specific ALMP-instruments (e.g., neo-
classic economic theory and the theory of collective action). Some theories argue that 
employers participate from altruistic reasons (CSR-theory), while others argue that they 
participate for economic reasons (neo-classic economic theory) or legitimatory reasons 
(e.g., institutional theory).
In the following, we have operationalized the power resource theory, Varieties of 
Capitalism, and neo-classical economic theory. This choice is a function of the limita-
tions of the survey. For example, testing institutional theory can be done by distinguish-
ing between whether or not a firm is a member of an employer association (Martin & 
Swank, 2012). The available empirical studies of the association between membership of 
employers’ associations and employers’ engagement in ALMPs are inconclusive. Martin 
Table I Why do employers participate in the implementation of ALMPs?
Theory argument
Neo-classic economic theory Employers will participate if it serves the short-term economic  
interests of the company (Friedman, 1962), for instance if participa-
tion reduces the total labor costs of the company (Ibsen, 1999).
Theory of collective action Employers will participate if participation produces “selective 
incentives” for the employers (Olson, 1971), for instance if services 
are exclusive to participants (e.g., judicial guidance or recruitment 
assistance).
Power resource theory Employers will participate if trade unions possess enough power-
resources to coerce or extort employers to participate in social 
policies, thereby making them consenters rather than antagonists 
(Korpi, 2006).
Varieties of capitalism Employers will participate if the public policies guard against the 
risk of investment in asset-specific skills. By reducing unemployment 
risks for workers with asset-specific skills, ALMPs may provide 
employers with the type of firm- and industry-specific skills they 
require to remain competitive leading them to support these  
policies (Hall & Soskice, 2001).
Institutional theory Employers will participate if peak employer associations join in  
the governance and delivery of collective policies, like social 
policies and ALMP and membership of employers association in 
turn promote the engagement of individual employers in ALMPs 
(Martin, 2004, 2005; Martin & Swank, 2012).
csr theory Employers will participate if they consider it to be the “right  
thing to do” for ethical or moral reasons (Aa & Berkel, 2014; 
Bredgaard, 2014).
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(2005) found that membership of national employers’ associations in Denmark was a 
highly salient positive determinant of participation in social programs, while Ingold 
and Valizade (2015) did not find a direct link between the two. Instead, they found a 
positive association between collective bargaining coverage and employers’ engagement 
in ALMPs, and suggest that collective bargaining may be an in important mediating 
variable. We cannot test the argument from CSR theory either due to insufficient survey 
data, but do know from previous research that one of the most important justifications 
of employers for participating in ALMP programs is their sense of social responsibility 
(Jakobsen et al., 2015). 
Hypothesis of the study
From this short introduction to theories of employers’ participation in ALPMs, we will 
derive a number of specific hypotheses to inform the empirical study of the participation 
of Danish employers in the wage subsidy scheme in Table 2.
Table II Hypothesized determinants for the participation of firms in ALMP 
Hypothesis 1 Skill-level Firms using specific skills are more likely to  
participate than firms using general skills. 
Hypothesis 2 Sector Firms in the service sector are less likely to  
participate than firms in the industry.
Hypothesis 3 Collective Agreement coverage Firms that covered higher coverage of collective 
agreements are more likely to participate than  
firms with lower coverage.
Hypothesis 4 Economic situation of the firm Firms where the economic situation has worsened 
within the last few years are more likely to partici-
pate than firms where the economic situation has 
improved in the last few years.
Hypothesis 5 Internationalization of the firm Firms with a primarily Danish ownership structure 
and firms that sell their products primarily on the 
national market are more likely to participate than 
firms owned primarily by foreign actors or selling 
their products on the international market
Hypothesis 1. Skill-level 
Within the VoC framework, ALMPs do not count as one of the main social institutions 
supporting the formation of a certain skill profile in firms. However, reading the litera-
ture on ALMP, these policies can function as “Employment Security” by quickly reinte-
grating the unemployed back into the labor market and reducing unemployment spells 
(Schmid, 1995; Madsen, 2011). As such, ALMP can in line with the VoC framework 
function as a social insurance against unemployment, thus reducing the uncertainty and 
collective problems associated with investing in specific skills. In line with this concep-
tion, the skill composition of the work force can be expected to have the following 
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effect: By shortening the unemployment spells, ALMPs can protect skilled wages thereby 
reducing the uncertainty associated with investing in industry and firm specific skills 
(Estevez-Abe et al., 2001, pp. 152–153). This thesis is operationalized as follows; if the 
firm has a majority of either skilled blue-collar workers or skilled white-collar workers, 
it will have an incentive to take part in implementing the wage subsidy scheme. Con-
versely, if the firm has a majority of workers with general skills, it will have an incentive 
not to take part in implementing wage subsidy schemes. 
Hypothesis 2. Sector
The sector in which the firm is situated is likewise within the VoC literature held out as 
a significant determinant for the preferences of firms. Whereas industry broadly under-
stood utilizes specific skills, general skills as well as more theoretical knowledge are 
more important in the service sector (Busemeyer & Trampusch, 2012, p. 28). These skill 
requirements of the sectors are expected to have a strong influence on the preference held 
by firms. The thesis is hypothesized as follows; the level of willingness of firms to imple-
ment the wage subsidy schemes will be a function of the sector within which they operate. 
Sector will be operationalized as public sector, the private service sector, or industry. 
Hypothesis 3. Collective agreement coverage
The power resources theories put an emphasis on the power resources of labor when 
seeking to account for both macro-level outputs such as redistribution (Korpi & Shalev, 
1979; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Huber & Stephens, 2001) and micro-level outputs such 
as the preferences for social institutions held by firms (Streeck & Schmitter, 1999). The 
level of collective bargaining coverage at the company level is thus a key explanatory 
variable influencing the involvement of firms in the implementation of wage subsidy 
schemes. Following Streeck and Schmitter (1999), employers will always prefer to avoid 
any involvement in social institutions of any kind. However, the presence of unions at 
the firm level can through “the logic of influence” force the employers to get involved 
in a social agenda, such as the implementation of job-placement schemes. This thesis is 
hypothesized as follows; the willingness displayed by firms in relation to implementing 
the wage subsidy schemes will be a function of the share of employees at a firm covered 
by a collective agreement.
Economic theories put critical emphasis on the role of economic characteristics as 
determinants for the preferences held by firms for ALMP. On the basis of the underlying 
“efficiency thesis” whereby increased competition forces firms to increase their competi-
tiveness by making the factors of production (labor, land, and money) more flexible, we 
can point to two additional variables that can be expected to influence the involvement 
of firms in the implementation of wage subsidy schemes: the economic situation of the 
firm and the internationalization of the firm.
Hypothesis 4. Economic situation of the firm
The economic situation of the firm can be expected to have the following effect on the 
dependent variable; worsened economic situation for the firm can lead it to participate 
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in the wage subsidy scheme in order to gain access to subsidized and cheap labor (Ibsen, 
1999). This thesis is hypothesized as follows; the willingness of firms in relation to imple-
menting the wage subsidy scheme will be a function of the economic situation of the firm. 
Hypothesis 5. Internationalization of the firm
Economists have argued that the globalization of markets have necessitated firms to shed 
themselves from social costs (Strange, 1996, pp. 59–65). Thus, the degree of internation-
alization experienced by the firm can be expected to influence to what degree the firm is 
willing to take on a social cost like implementing the wage subsidy scheme. This thesis 
is hypothesized as follows; the willingness to actively engage in implementing the wage 
subsidy scheme will be a function of the internationalization of the firm. The internation-
alization of the firm is operationalized along two independent variables. The firms are 
asked if the primary markets of the firm is either national or international. Second, the 
firms are asked if they are primarily national or international in their ownership structure. 
research Design, Data, and Methods
We use survey data that have been collected by Statistics Denmark among a represen-
tative sample of Danish companies with more than five employees in the autumn of 
2013. Four thousand five hundred workplaces were contacted and 1499 workplaces 
completed the questionnaire (response rate = 33%). The respondents were the persons 
making decisions on personnel management (e.g., HRM manager, owner, or director). 
The data were then weighted by industry and the number of employees in order to 
ensure that the sample was representative for the population of Danish companies. The 
dependent variable chosen for this study is a question that seeks to survey the involve-
ment of a firm in implementing the wage subsidy scheme: “Does the firm currently have 
one or more people employed in wage subsidies?” The response category is dichotomous 
in the form of a “yes” and “no” category. 
Besides effectively surveying the involvement of firms, wage subsidies were chosen 
because the distribution of cases is fairly even; 39% answered yes and 61% answered no. 
Seeing as the dependent variable is binary or dichotomous, the statistical model used must 
be a logistic regression as opposed to a linear regression, which is most fitting if the depen-
dent variable is continuous (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2013, ch. 1.1). The method by which we 
will test our hypothesis regarding what determinants can explain the involvement of firms 
in the implementation of wage subsidies is the binary logistical regression model. As a way 
of testing the correlation, we will do this through odds ratio and Nagelkerke. Nagelkerke 
shows the strength of the correlation in much the same way as R Square does (Nagelkerke, 
1991). Odds ratio allows us to evaluate the likeliness of a certain outcome among respon-
dent X as compared with respondent Y (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2013, ch. 3.2).
Empirical results
We have analyzed these determinants on the basis of the hypotheses presented earlier 
in Table 3.
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Table III  Characteristics of firms engaging in the implementation of job-placement schemes, binary 
logistic regression (odds ratio)
skill composition of the work force
        0% unskilled 




















share of employees in the firm working under a collective agreement
50% or less 
More than 51% 
Baseline
1.976***










N (% of total N) 1461 (97.5)




Note: Binary logistical regression (Does the firm currently have one or several people employed in job-placement 
schemes? (0 = no, 1 = yes). P-value: *** <0.001; ** <0.01; * <0.05.
The variables that proved insignificant in the regressions have been omitted in the table 
above. The regressions were conducted in three stages, where a new set of theoretically 
deduced variables were included at each stage. This allows the research to better evalu-
ate if the variables are susceptible to interaction effects from other variables. A separate 
regression involving only the economic determinants was conducted (sector and size 
was controlled for), which give 0.646* and 1.963*. A regression was also conducted 
where the Public Sector was omitted. This shows the exact same independent variables 
to be significant and strong. Due to this, the public sector is included in the table above 
to increase the overall N. As we can see from the Nagelkerke value in the bottom of 
the table, 29.1% of the variance in the firms’ response to the question: “Does the com-
pany currently have one or several people employed in job-placement schemes?” can be 
explained by the omitted determinants and their derived variables.
Initially, the regressions conducted show that most of the sector variables are insig-
nificant. Of the nine different industries belonging to either the service sector, indus-
try, or the public sector, the only sector where the effect is significant is that of the 
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public sector. Compared with the baseline (construction), firms in the public sector had 
2.561*** higher odds of being engaged in implementing wage subsidy schemes, than 
firms in the construction sector. 
The skill composition of employees holds a central position within the VoC frame-
work. However, the empirical evidence does not confirm this as an explanatory vari-
able. The regression analysis shows that as the share of unskilled workers in a firm 
increases, the odds that the firm will employ an unemployed through a wage subsidy 
scheme decreases from 1.851** for firms with 1–20% unskilled to 1.770* for firms 
with 40–60% unskilled. Furthermore, we also find significant effects from the variable 
showing the share of employed with MSc. degrees at the firm. Here, the regression show 
that as the share of workers with MSc. degrees increases from between 21–40% to 
61–80% and 81–100%, the odds that the firm will engage in implementing the wage 
subsidy scheme decreases in the third column from 0.408* to 0.358* and 0.368*. These 
results partly confirm the hypotheses on the effect of the skill composition. As the share 
of workers with general skills increase, the willingness of the firm to engage in the 
implementation of ALMP decreases. However, the regression analysis does not show the 
opposite to be true. The regression does not show that as the share of workers with spe-
cific skills increases, so does the willingness to engage in the implementation of ALMP. 
Therefore, despite occupying a central place in the VoC framework, skill composition of 
the work force seems a weaker explanation of firms’ participation in ALMP. This merits 
further academic analyses of this particular correlation.
The share of employees covered by collective agreements is also found to be impor-
tant for participation in wage subsidy schemes. We find that firms where more than 51% 
are covered by collective agreements have 1.976*** times higher odds of being involved 
in the implementation of the wage subsidy scheme than in firms where less than 50% 
are covered by collective agreements. 
The economic situation of the firm and the nationality of the primary ownership 
have explanatory power as well. If we initially turn to the role played by the economic 
situation of the firm, we find that the hypothesis holds. Using firms where the economic 
situation within the last few years have worsened as baseline, we find that firms where 
the economic situation has improved within the last few years have 0.679* times lower 
odds of implementing the wage subsidy scheme than the baseline category. Turning to 
the next variable, we find that the nationality of the actors controlling the main part of 
the firm has a strong impact. Firms primarily owned by Danish actors have 1.943* times 
higher odds than the firms primarily owned by foreign actors to participate in wage 
subsidies. The data thus seem to confirm the existence of the globalization v. ALMP 
dilemma; globalization necessitates ALMP and the engagement of employers in ALMP, 
but it also drives the firms to make their activities more efficient and shed themselves of 
social responsibilities that are not considered to contribute to the economic performance 
of the company. The establishment of this dilemma falls much in line with scholarly lit-
erature on the effects of globalization (McKenzie & Lee, 1991; Strange, 1996).
conclusion
Active participation of employers in the integration of unemployed in the labor market 
is crucial for the effectiveness of ALMPs. But the literature as well as policies of ALMPs 
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have tended to neglect the role of employers and instead focused on the “supply-side” 
of the labor market. Denmark is considered a “best case” of employers’ engagement in 
the implementation of ALMPs. Comparative studies indicate that in general, Danish 
employers are more likely to participate actively in the delivery of ALMPs than employ-
ers in other comparable countries, for example, the UK and Germany. 
Nevertheless, even in Denmark, a large proportion of firms do not participate in the 
delivery of ALMPs. So, why do some employers participate in the delivery of ALMPs, 
while others do not participate. In the literature, there are six promising candidates for 
a theoretical grounding of the motivations of employers to participate in ALMPs: Neo-
classic economic theory, the theory of collective action, power resource theory, varieties 
of capitalism, institutional theory, and CSR theory. Each of these theories can be used 
to formulate specific empirical hypotheses about firms’ participation in ALMPs, and in 
this case the wage subsidy scheme. The wage subsidy scheme is the first example of an 
ALMP instrument in Denmark and requires a deeper level of commitment of employers 
than other instruments. It is also the most effective instrument in the ALMP toolbox, 
especially when applied in the private sector.
The empirical results of this study show that the participation of employers in the 
Danish wage subsidy scheme is determined by a number of different variables. First, 
the empirical analysis showed that employers with a higher proportion of unskilled 
workers or a lower proportion of graduates were more likely to use the wage subsidy 
scheme. This finding may be explained by the fact that the majority of unemployed 
who participate in the wage subsidy scheme are in fact unskilled or low-skilled, thereby 
providing employers with an improved base for recruitment. Second, the proportion of 
employees covered by collective agreements was also found to correlate with partici-
pation in the wage subsidy scheme, so that firms with a higher coverage of collective 
agreements were more likely to participate. Third, firms where the economic situation 
had worsened within the last years were more likely to participate in the wage subsidy 
scheme. The empirical evidence thus indicates that firms may use subsidized labor as 
a means of coping with economic hardship leading to distortion of competition and 
crowding out. Finally, we found that the sector and nationality of the firm could also 
explain participation in the wage subsidy scheme. The analysis confirmed previous 
research that employers in the public sector and firms owned by Danish actors were 
more likely to participate in ALMPs than employers in the private sector and firms 
owned by international actors. 
The analysis clearly shows that firms are not only the means-end calculating entities 
but they are also often assumed to be in both economic theory and public choice theo-
ries. Their preferences for ALMP, in general, and wage subsidy schemes, in particular, 
cannot be explained solely with reference to their economic characteristics alone. These 
findings fall in line with previous analyses on the preferences of Danish firms for flexi-
curity (Author & Author, 2015). 
The role of employers in the delivery of ALMPs is still a new and emerging field of 
research. We have taken the first steps toward a theoretically informed empirical analysis 
of employers’ participation in ALMP. The research should be pursued further by com-
parative data to measure national differences in employers’ engagement and historical 
data to compare temporal changes in employers’ engagement in social and labor market 
policies. The empirical analysis would also benefit from more detailed qualitative stud-
ies of the preference formation of employers and actual implementation processes at the 
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company level. Considering the centrality of employers in implementing ALMPs, these 
are important topics for future research.
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